Theory of evolution and the thesis of theoretical indeterminacy

A scientific theory is scientific only if it can be subject to empirical verifications, to be put to some empirical test. Such theory has to be verified by trying to falsify it. The problem with the theory of evolution is that there is no observation which can in principle falsify it, and therefore it cannot be subject to any test. There is no way to test it. It indicates that the theory has more a philosophical character than scientific, and it should be treated philosophically, which is more to my taste:-)

The reason why it cannot be in principle falsified lies in the role it has in our scientific practice. The theory is rather an exemplification of a theoretical and methodological paradigm of scientific research in biology. This means that the biological research is framed within the methodological framework of this theory. The theory of evolution represents the principles of theoretical interpretation of our observations, because it urges to interpret all observations within this evolutionary framework. Therefore you cannot falsify the theory, since it is an integral part of our modern scientific paradigm. A theory is scientific within some paradigm if and only if you can test it within its paradigm. Paradigms themselves cannot be tested. They rather function as an explanatory framework that shapes our explanations. The same thing applies for the competing creationist theory. Creationists also try to explain scientific observations, however their explanations are not scientific because they cannot be tested within their paradigm.

Therefore, neither the theory of evolution nor the competing creationist theory are scientific theories.

Even if we assume that the theory of evolution has a status of a scientific theory then the creationist theory would also have this status, simply because it is a competing theory. A theory rival to some scientific theory is scientific due to being subject to test by its rival. The problem is that both theories in principle can explain all relevant empirical observations. (See for instance the article about the age of the earth , that shows how a creationist interpret data). In other words, there is always a theoretical indeterminacy in the virtue of the undecidability of which interpretation to adopt. I believe that it is perfectly possible to reinterpret all evidences for the support for evolution in a creationist manner, and vice versa. Reinterpretations can be either in trying to appeal to inaccuracies/unreliability in certain measurement/observations (especially in the issue on the age of the Earth), or to give a "different story" in the explanations of these observations. For instance, the fossils can be interpreted in many ways. Someone would interpret them as an evidence for the Flood. (It is interesting that almost all mythologies of the world tell about the Flood. Of course, mythologies are not necessary true, but they try to convey some truths in a symbolical way).

It is now a dominant position in the philosophy of science that our scientific practice is inherently theoretically indeterminate. Did you have by a chance heard of Kuhn, Quine and Gödel?

Willard Van Orman Quine (June 25, 1908 - December 25, 2000) is perhaps the most important American philosopher of the twentieth century. Quine was a logician by training. His arguments were devastating to some of the most central dogmas of analytic philosophy, shaking up logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language.

For the most part, he spent his career at Harvard. Early in his academic career, Quine came under the influence of members of the Vienna Circle, especially Rudolf Carnap. Although his work would expose serious flaws in the foundations of Carnap's (logical positivist, empiricist) view, Quine struggled to remain true to the spirit of positivism. He remained empiricist and physicalist, and was a great proponent of naturalism -- the view that philosophy is like a natural science, investigating phenomena in the real world, and should borrow its methods from science.

He published 22 books, was awarded honorary degrees from 18 universities, and was the recipient of numerous other honors. He travelled and lectured widely throughout his life and was the mentor and advisor of a great many of today's famous philosophers, including Donald Davidson. (He also taught songwriter Tom Lehrer and Unabomber Theodore Kaczynski.) His political views were notoriously right-wing.

Initially trained in mathematics at Oberlin College and Harvard University before studying at Prague under Rudolf Carnap, he received an M.A. from Oxford and a Ph.D. from Harvard (1932) in philosophy. While at Harvard as lecturer and professor (1936-78), Quine was honored as president of the American Philosophical Association (1951) and the Association for Symbolic Logic (1953-55) and received the Butler Gold Medal from Columbia University (1970). Among his publications are A System of Logistic (1934), Mathematical Logic (1940), Elementary Logic (1941), From a Logical Point of View (1953), Word and Object (1960), Set Theory and Its Logic (1963), Philosophy of Logic (1970), and The Roots of Reference (1973). Although I am not a physicalist, I respect his thesis of the interpretive indeterminacy of all our scientific data, which is now accepted by almost every theoretician in the field. The thesis namely says that no amount of our observations can determine which theory to choose.

Thomas Kuhn earned bachelor's (1943) and master's (1946) degrees in physics at Harvard University but obtained his Ph.D. (1949) there in the history of science. He taught the history or philosophy of science at Harvard (1951-56), the University of California at Berkeley (1956-64), Princeton University (1964-79), and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1979-91). In his first book, The Copernican Revolution (1957), Kuhn studied the development of the heliocentric theory of the solar system during the Renaissance. In his landmark second book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , he argued that scientific research and thought are defined by "paradigms," or conceptual world-views, that consist of formal theories, classic experiments, and trusted methods. Kuhn questioned the traditional conception of scientific progress as a gradual, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on rationally chosen experimental frameworks. Instead, he argued that the paradigm determines the kinds of experiments scientists perform, the types of questions they ask, and the problems they consider important. A shift in the paradigm alters the fundamental concepts underlying research where the new theories are incommensurate with the old ones. The point is that theories belonging to different paradigms are incommensurable, which means that both (rival) theories can be compatible with the scientific data.

The most important personality in mathematics and mathematical logic is Kurt Gödel by his revolutionary theorems of the undecidability (they are theorems and not theses, logically proved propositions in mathematical logic). In not going in the technical details of his ingenious arguments, the consequences of his theorems are revolutionary for the understanding of the logical structure of language. Briefly said, in a consistent first order language there is a sentence which neither can be proved nor be refuted from the axioms that constitutes the language in question. Higher order and consistent languages inherit this property of undecidability. Although our daily language is far from being a formal one, we might conceive of certain unambigious descriptive sentences that in principle neither can be verified not falsified. Such sentences would be practically undecidible.

Most philosophical statements are practically undecidable, e.g. moral statements, because their truth (or falsehood) are independ from empirical verification. Their truth/falsehood depends more on logical relation between concepts constituting the meaning of these statements. Likewise, theological statements about God or gods would belong to the category of practical undecidable statements. Therefore, a statement, as "God exists," neither can be proved nor be refuted. It is a practical undecidable sentence in our descriptive-scientific fragment of language.

Thus, we always have some uncertainty in our beliefs and we are confronted with a choice regarding some undecidable sentences. When we choose to adopt one of the alternatives, we thereby express our affinity towards what we choose, expressing our love. Therefore, Jesus did insist that we have to believe if we shall express our love to God. The Bible clearly insists that it is impossible to love God without a belief (Heb. 11:6).

By our belief we express our freedom, for there is always one uncertainty in our understanding. God does not wish that a compulsive knowledge would force us to accept Him. With our belief we simply express our freedom to choose. Think more about how belief is a pervading feature in our lives and in our relations to other people, and you will realize how important it is. In our relation to other people we show our confidence, and love can never be fully present if there is no minimal presence of trust. If you choose to believe in God then you have showed Love to God, love which exceedingly impresses Him, because there are so many reasons not to believe in Him. It is now we can express our love to Him, and not when we are in the Presence of His Beauty in heaven, which would compellingly draw us into divine Bliss and worship of His Divine Being because God's Being is Gloriously Beatiful, Good, Wise and Morally Perfect.

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